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a b s t r a c t
We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate
with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the
political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from
emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low
cost.
We propose an alternative voting method based on random assignments of voting rights. Agents are
given chances to vote instead of weights. If chances are computed according to a specific formula, no po-
litical distortion occurs. As an application, we analyze the rotation voting system recently adopted by the
European Central Bank. We find that this system yields an enormous amount of political distortion. Then
we compute the voting chances that should be assigned to Eurozone countries in order to eliminate it.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Voting is probably themost commonway tomake collective de-
cisions and tensions amongst partners are normal when there are
differences of opinion about what to do. Nonetheless one would
expect lower tensions when voting rules are fair. A common idea
is that voting rules, such as majority threshold and vote weight-
ing, can be chosen in order to guarantee enough representation for
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doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.12.003the majority and sufficient protection for the minority. But how
can we really judge the fairness of a voting system? Can weighted
votes and super-majorities guarantee fairness?
These are old questions that we approach in the following per-
spective. Any common project among partners produces a cer-
tain amount of payoffs. Partners can be States in a federal context,
factions in legislatures or boards, ethnic groups, companies in a
joint venture, and so on. By common project we mean any kind of
cooperation that yields a positive value, such as building a public
infrastructure, implementing a common policy, launching a new
product, etc. The value has to be split among partners. We con-
sider two alternatives. First, the partners reach an agreement on
payoff division through a negotiation process that we call ‘‘eco-
nomic bargaining’’, in which bargaining power only derives from
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partners split the payoffs through a decision made by voting, in
which power is given by voting rules, that define the way the part-
ners contribute to the decision. We name the second alternative
‘‘political bargaining’’. We model the economic and the political
bargaining as two games in coalitional form. Then we apply the
same solution concept, the Shapley value, to these two games and
compare the solutions. If they are different, then a certain amount
of ‘‘political distortion’’ in payoff division occurs. Thus there might
be situations in which a player gets a lot, not because he con-
tributes a lot, but just because he has got a lot of voting rights.
Onemay conclude that toomuch distortionmeans unfair voting
rules. Butwe do not take the avenue of analyzing howmuch distor-
tion is tolerable in a fair voting system.We rather address three dif-
ferent questions, one positive and two normative. First, wewant to
see if, in the class of weighted voting games, it is always possible to
set up a weight apportionment and a majority threshold that yield
no distortion. The answer is ‘‘No’’. This class is too limited because
weights are a discrete tool of power assignment. In otherwords, for
a large mass of economic games, the solution cannot be replicated
by a weighted voting game. Thus a certain amount of distortion,
and possibly unfairness, is unavoidable.
Second, we study how political distortions are related to the
players’ chance of leaving the political group. We find that fore-
seeing a secession clause or a breakdown scenario among the con-
stitutional or statutory provisions may reduce political distortions
substantially. Notice that distortions do not decrease when seces-
sion occurs, but when secession becomes a viable alternative, a
credible threat. This possibly explains why the European Union
has introduced a secession clause in the recently adopted Lisbon
Treaty.
Finally, we look for an alternative voting method that yields
zero distortion. Instead of a certain amount of votes, a partner is
given a chance of being selected for a one-vote right. For example,
partner a is not assigned, say, 3 votes, but rather he has, say, 47%
probability of being selected for voting; partner b has, say, 29%
probability of being selected, instead of 2 votes. . . . Chances are
a continuous tool of power assignment. Thus, for any economic
game, it is always possible to find a distribution of selection
probabilities such that expected political distortion is zero. We
show how to compute these probabilities.
The random assignment of vote rights proposed here is not the
unique mechanism that eliminates political distortions. However,
we think that it is not so distant from what in reality happens
in some international institutions like the IMF or the UN Security
Council. Most countries do not have a permanent right to vote.
Some of them are appointed as non-permanent members. Simi-
larly, the European Central Bank has recently decided to adopt a
newvoting system inwhich governors of different countries are as-
signed the right to vote according to a rotationmechanism. The ro-
tation speed depends on each country’s economic relevance. In the
last part of the paper, as an application, wemeasure the amount of
distortion that this new system would produce. The picture is not
encouraging: distortions are quite large, despite the reform. Then
we show how an alternative distortion-free system based on ran-
dom selection should be crafted.
We suggest that random selection is better than rotation or ap-
pointment, and possibly not too difficult to implement in practice.
It should be adopted not only in supranational bodies, but in a
wider range of situations, such as federal systems or boards.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some ba-
sics on the Shapley–Shubik (SS) index and surveys the related lit-
erature. Section 3 illustrates the basic approach and analyzes the
sources of political distortion. Section 4 explores the role of out-
side options in the political bargaining. In Section 5 we present the
voting rule based on random selection and show how it can be ap-
plied to specific contexts or how to use it for drafting a constitution.
Section 6 applies our findings to the Council of governors of the ECB
while Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix.2. Preliminaries and related literature
Our exercise amounts to analyzing the distortion that occurs
when bargaining in a general negotiation context, such as themar-
ket, is replaced by bargaining in a voting context, such as a legis-
lature. As pointed out earlier, since we want to focus only on the
difference between economic and political games, not on the dif-
ferences in the way we solve them, we use a common solution
concept. We use the Shapley value to solve both bargaining games
(Shapley, 1953). This solution is fully axiomatic and does not re-
quire any specific or contingent description of how negotiations
take place. Moreover, it is based on a parsimonious set of axioms
that can be given a normative reading in terms of fairness.1
Nonetheless, how the sub-coalitions form, whether they are
stable, etc. are essential ingredients of the underlying bargaining
games. We will come back to this point in Section 4. We will see
that the way the political and the economic game interact is cru-
cially determined by the availability of outside options and, ulti-
mately, by the cost of leaving the political group.
The Shapley solution of a voting game is the Shapley–Shubik
(SS) power index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954).2 L. Shapley and M.
Shubik claim that their power measure is ‘‘ineluctable’’ since ‘‘any
scheme for imputing power among the members of a committee
system either yields the power index defined above or leads to a
logical inconsistency’’ (Shapley and Shubik, 1954, p. 789).
Still a question remains: is political power a measure of a
player’s expected worth? Roth (1988a) shows how the Shapley
value can be interpreted as an expected utility function and Laru-
elle and Valenciano (2003) provide an axiomatic foundation of this
view.Moreover, Felsenthal andMachover (1998) point out that the
SS index, being derived from a solution of a cooperative game, cor-
responds to a notion of ‘‘voting power as expected share in fixed to-
tal prize’’ (p. xiii). Roth (1988b) suggests the possibility that voting
power and bargaining solution may be different, but only ‘‘when
we are interpreting a simple game as something other than a trans-
ferable utility characteristic function game’’ (p. 8). Thus, the answer
to the question above is ‘‘Yes’’ at least when there is a means to
transfer utility, like side-payments. In this case the value of one
player’s votes is his SS index. This implies that a risk-neutral voter
is indifferent between voting, with the prospect of getting his SS
value, and by-passing voting if he is offered SS. In accordance with
this literature, we claim that a player’s SS index is not only a mea-
sure of his voting power, but also of the monetary value that he
expects from playing a voting game.3 Nevertheless, a proportional
agents’ representation in voting does not ensure a proportional
power: rather, this latter requires a non-proportional distribution
of voting weights, as justified by Laslier (2012).
1 Myerson (1980) shows that Shapley’s allocation rule guarantees fairness in
political payoffs division, while Van den Brink (2002) demonstrates that any
solution which satisfies symmetry and additivity, and this is the case, also satisfies
fairness.
2 Recent applications of power indices to decision-making in the European
Union have stimulated a broad literature (an incomplete list includes Baldwin and
Widgrén, 2004; Felsenthal and Machover, 2004; Napel and Widgrén, 2006, 2011;
BrahamandHoller, 2005; Laruelle andValenciano, 2008b; Passarelli and Barr, 2007;
Barr and Passarelli, 2009; Benati and Vittucci Marzetti, 2011) and a lively debate
with some sceptical views (Garrett and Tsebelis, 1999).
3 Although the Shapley value is framed in the cooperative approach to the
bargaining problem, there are in the literature several examples of non-cooperative
(extensive form) games that yield the Shapley value. See for instance Gul (1989),
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996), and Maskin (2003). These games represent credible
descriptions of what happens in a purely economic environment (e.g. a market) as
well as in a political environment (e.g. a legislature).
Recently, Laruelle and Valenciano (2007, 2008a, 2009) explore both the non-
cooperative foundations and the axiomatic properties of the SS as a measure of
bargaining power.
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tions can be reduced or avoided either by allowing for secession or
by using probabilities of being selected for vote. As regards the role
of a secession clause, to the best of our knowledge, no work has
been done so far. As for the use of probabilities, Berg and Holler
(1986) propose to randomize the qualified majority threshold as
a means to avoid discrepancy between the seat distribution in a
committee and an exogenous distribution of voting power. This
idea is also present in Turnovec (2009). Unlike both of theseworks,
we specifically analyze differences between economic and political
power, and we study how the randomization mechanism should
be computed based on the economic game played by the agents.
Moreover, we explore the level of centralization of the political
union by considering outside options in the political game.
Ourwork is related to another relevant body of literaturewhich
has investigated qualified majority and voting apportionments
from a normative viewpoint. Laruelle and Valenciano (2004) char-
acterize axiomatically the fairness properties of power indices.
Choosing a power index entails choosing a measure of inequality.
Fairness is also the main concern of Leech (2002), who proposes
an algorithm to compute the weights and the majority threshold
that equalize per-capita voting power of each member state in the
EU Council. Casella (2005) suggests that the possibility of ‘‘stor-
ing’’ votes improves allocation when players have heterogeneous
policy preferences. Casella et al. (2010) test this hypothesis. Alesina
and Passarelli (2010) suggest that rules are optimal if they assign
the pivotal role to the voterwhose interests are similar to the social
planner’s ones. Instead, other authors prefer to use different mea-
sures of power. Aleskerov (2008), for instance, uses new power in-
dices to examine the power distribution in the Russian parliament,
while in Breton et al. (2012) the concept of nucleolus is applied
to the EU Council of Ministers. These works are mainly concerned
with efficiency issues, and they stick to ‘‘traditional’’ voting meth-
ods, such as weighted voting and super-majority rules.
In the present paper we focus on distributional problems,
and our proposal of a randomization scheme somehow breaks
with this tradition. The random selection of voters has recently
become a popular topic of the law literature. The main concern
is representation and fairness in general elections. Lpez-Guerra
(2011) claims that if voters are randomly selected to cast their
ballots, and they get well informed about the candidates, the
quality of electoral outcomes improves with respect to universal
suffrage. Other authors propose lottery voting, a system in which
the winner representative is randomly drawn from a distribution
that reflects how citizens have cast their votes (Amar, 1984). This
system would guarantee better representation of the minorities
and more turnout (Sewell et al., 2009). We share with this
literature the basic idea that randomizing vote rights can improve
fairness. We differ from it in the way random assignments of vote
rights are derived. We do not look at the way citizens cast their
votes but, more fundamentally, at the way citizens’ interests are
reflected by the payoff division in the economic game. Finally, our
approach is perhaps more general and applies also to non-political
committees.
3. Setup
3.1. The economic game
Consider a setN = {1, . . . , n} of players and denotewith 2N the
set of all possible subsets (coalitions) of N . Let γ : 2N −→ [0, 1]
be the characteristic function which assigns a worth γ (S) to any
coalition S ⊆ N . One may interpret γ (S) as the maximum payoff
achievable by using the resources of the players in any coalition S.Let (N, γ ) be a transferable-utility (TU) convex game, and call
it the economic game.4 The economic game is solved by using the
Shapley solution ϕ(γ ) = {ϕ1(γ ), . . . , ϕn(γ )}, where
ϕi(γ ) ≡

S⊆N\i
p(S) ·∆iγ (S) (1)
with p(S) = s!(n−s−1)!n! ,∆iγ (S) = γ (S ∪ i)− γ (S), s = |S|, and i =
1, . . . , n. Observe that∆iγ (S) is player i’s marginal contribution to
coalition S and p(S) can be considered as the probability of S, with
the underlying idea that all players’ orderings are equally likely
(symmetry). Thus any player expects to be rewarded with her
expectedmarginal contribution to the random coalition S. Observe
also that

i∈N ϕi(γ ) = γ (N) (efficiency). For the sake of simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that γ (N) = 1.
The interpretation is that, had the payers to bargain into the
market for the division of the unit-payoff of an economic project,
a likely and fair division would assign each player i a share ϕi(γ ).
Below we sometimes call ϕi(γ ) the economic solution in order to
contrast it with the political solution described in the following
section.
3.2. The voting game
Consider the same set N of players. Let (N, v) be a TU game
and call it a voting game, where v : 2N −→ {0, 1} is a simple
characteristic function describing a voting situation as follows:
v(S) =

1 if S is winning
0 if S is losing.
Solving the voting game with the Shapley value in (1) yields the
Shapley–Shubik power index, SS:
φi(v) ≡

S⊆N\i
p(S) ·∆iv(S) (2)
where p(S) is the same as in (1). Let us interpret v(S) as a usual
characteristic function of a TU game: v(S) represents the payoff,
normalized to one, that originates from the political decisionmade
by the members of coalition S. Reaching a majority is the only way
to make this decision; and the decision is the only way to produce
the payoff. What is relevant in the political game is forming a
majority. The pivot is the voter who swings a coalition from losing
to winning. His vote’s worth is the full amount of the payoff.
Any voter is rewarded by his chance to play a pivotal role. In
fact, φi(v) in (2) represents voter i’s probability to end up in a
pivotal situation. Since utility is transferable,φi(v)maybe assigned
through monetary side-payments.
Voting games areweightedwhen voters are assigned a different
amount of votes. Sometimes a qualified majority is required. If
it is the case, the voting game is usually represented with v =
(q;w1, . . . , wn), where q denotes the majority threshold andwi is
player i’s number of votes (i.e. weight).
3.3. Political distortions
Assume that players cannot play the economic game without
having formed a majority in the voting game. This reflects many
real situations in which partners (States, provinces, regions, po-
litical factions, groups in corporations, . . . ) engage in a common
4 A game is convex if its characteristic function γ is supermodular: γ (S ∪ T ) +
γ (S ∩ T ) ≥ γ (S) + γ (T ),∀S, T ⊆ N , or equivalently: γ (S ∪ {i}) − γ (S) ≤
γ (T ∪ {i}) − γ (T ),∀S ⊆ T ⊆ N \ {i} ,∀i ∈ N . Supermodularity trivially implies
superadditivity, therefore a convex game is superadditive too.
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cally, the decision in the voting game also specifies how the payoffs
of an economic project will be distributed; i.e. the bill to be voted
sounds like: ‘‘Let γ (N) be produced and let it be distributed as spec-
ified in the present bill’’. In this case, the distributional provisions
of the bill become the object of a ‘‘political bargaining’’ amongst
voters, and side-payments which allow payoffs to be apportioned
among players are possibly also included into the bill. In a way,
political bargaining ‘‘replaces’’ economic bargaining, and political
power substitutes economic power.5 Therefore voting rules rather
than economic roles determine howpayoffs are distributed. For ex-
ample, a player that is rather unimportant in the economic game
can get a lot if he is quite powerful in the political game. This causes
what we call here a political distortion, i.e. a discrepancy between
political and economic power which affects the payoff allocation.
We measure the political distortion with the difference between
the Shapley value of the political game (i.e. the SS index) and the
Shapley value of the economic game.
Definition 1. Call PD (Political Distortion) the difference between
the Shapley–Shubik index of the political game and the Shapley
value of the economic game:
PD(v, γ ) = φ(v)− ϕ(γ ).
For player i,
PDi(v, γ ) = φi(v)− ϕi(γ ) =

S⊆N\i
p(S) · [∆iv(S)−∆iγ (S)] . (3)
PDi represents the additional gain (the loss, if negative) that
player i enjoys when the payoff allocation is made within a polit-
ical context instead of an economic contest, like the market. This
gain can be very large if player i has much more political power
than economic power. Since both φi(v) and ϕi(γ ) sum up to one,
then

N PDi(γ , v) = 0. This means that the PDi’s represent pure
redistributions amongst players, to the exclusive advantage of the
players which aremore politically than economically powerful. Let
us see this point with an example.
Example 1. Consider an economic game (N, γ 1) which consists
of an agreement on the realization of a common infrastructure
(an airport, a power plant, an oil pipeline, . . . ) amongst the three
States of a federal country (a, b, c). Suppose that their economies
have different sizes and characteristics so that their contribu-
tions to the creation of a common value are different. Let the
characteristic function of this economic game be the following:
γ 1(∅) = 0, γ 1(a) = 0.3, γ 1(b) = 0.1, γ 1(c) = 0.2, γ 1(a, b) =
0.5, γ 1(a, c) = 0.6, γ 1(b, c) = 0.4, γ 1(a, b, c) = 1. For example,
State a is big and could build a rather large infrastructure that is
worth γ 1(a) = 0.3. Of course, it would make a larger one, which
is worth 0.5, if also State b participates, γ 1(a, b) = 0.5.
The Shapley value for this game is: ϕ(γ 1) = {0.43, 0.23, 0.33}
and reflects the players’ expected contributions to the common
value. For example, State a, the largest contributor, gets the largest
share. Reasonably, this solution would be achieved if the three
countries could negotiate in a market context.
5 Although distributional provisions, such as taxation or subsidies, are frequent
in legislation, the assumption that the law includes those provisions is redundant in
our analysis. In TU games the presence of a medium of payment allows the players
to share γ (N) even without specific law provisions. What allows the legislative
bargaining to replace the economic one is specifically the fact that γ (N) cannot
be produced without the political decision. Note that v(N) does not imply that all
players are in the majority. It rather means that the majority decision has been
reached, and that decision is enforced to the minority too.Suppose that the agreement can be implemented only if there
is a formal decisionmade by simplemajority, in which every coun-
try has one vote. In this case, the political game is v1 = (2; 1, 1, 1).
The SS solution is φ(v1) = {0.33, 0.33, 0.33}. Since all countries
count the same in the political game, they expect to be rewarded
the same for casting their vote. Therefore, the vector of political
distortions is PD(v1, γ 1) = {−0.1,+0.1, 0}. Thus player a suf-
fers a loss from having less political power than economic power.
On the contrary, the economically weak country b takes advantage
from being equally important as the other players in the political
decision. In some sense, PDa(v1, γ 1) = −0.1 represents a transfer
made by a to b for having b taking part in the joint political decision.
Example 1 illustrates that political distortions may be large
when voting weights do not reflect economic power. As pointed
out earlier, an important assumption so far is that a common
political decision is the only way to realize the common project.
The partners by no means can undertake even a small part
of the project without the permission of the majority. In our
example, this entails a high level of centralization, which is in
fact what happens realistically when some policy areas are the
exclusive competence of the central government (energy policy,
infrastructures/environment, monetary policy, defense, foreign
policy, . . . ).6 Thanks to this assumption, the political game can be
described with a simple characteristic function. Players have no
outside option and the solution is the Shapley–Shubik index. In
case the partners have the option to quit the group and undertake
the project on their own, the political game is no longer simple.We
come back to this point in Section 4, where we show that things
may change substantially.
We wonder now if there is any chance to eliminate political
distortions by using appropriate weights and majority thresholds.
The question is: given an economic game, is it always possible to
find a weighted voting game with the same solution? In this case,
the PDi’s would be zero for all players. The answer to this question
is ‘‘No’’. There is a class of economic games, which we show is a
huge one, whose solutions cannot be replicated by the solution
of any (possibly weighted) voting game. For economic games in
this class, a certain amount of political distortion is unavoidable.
Take game (N, γ 1) of Example 1. a’s weight is possibly too low.
However, it is impossible to find a weight apportionment and a
majority threshold such that φa = 0.43. The reason is that with
three players the class of SS solutions of all possible weighted
voting games is relatively small and it does not include 0.43,
whereas the class of economic games’ solutions is an infinite set,
dense in [0, 1] (see Fig. 1 below).
Proposition 1. Let Γ be the set of all TU economic games (N, γ )
and let Σ be the set of all voting games. For any i ∈ N, (i) the
set of all Shapley values {ϕi(γ ) : (N, γ ) ∈ Γ } is a dense subset
of [0, 1]; (ii) the set of SS values {φi(v) : (N, v) ∈ Σ} is a non-dense
subset of [0, 1].
The idea from Proposition 1 is that voting games are unable
to yield all allocations that for example a market may guarantee.
The class of political solutions is too little: the economic value of a
player can be any point in [0, 1], whereas the space of all political
solutions (i.e. the set of all SS indices for that player) is only a
discrete collection of points in the unit interval. In other words, the
set of political solutions has ‘‘holes’’ in that interval. If the economic
solution is in one of those holes, there is political distortion. Thus
a player’s value of playing an economic game is different from his
value of playing a political game.
6 This is also what happens in non-political contexts, such as companies,
organizations, condominiums, . . . .
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This is the case of player a (and b) in game γ 1 of Example 1.
Fig. 1 offers a graphical representation of the distortion suffered
by player a (which amounts to PDa(v1, γ 1) = −0.1) if the
political game v1 is adopted. The bullet points represent the
political solutions of other possible voting games. With three
players the set of all SS solutions consists of six bullet points ‘‘only’’:
Ψi(Σ) =

0, 16 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 ,
2
3 , 1

.7 For example, a voting game like v2 =
(5; 3, 1, 2)withmore ‘‘proportionate’’ weights would grant player
a with φa(v2) = 1/2. However, still a certain amount of political
distortion occurs also in this case.
An economic solution can be any point in the unit interval,
whereas a political solution belongs only to a limited set of points.
This means that political distortions are quite likely in reality.
Choosing weights that better reflect economic power may reduce
distortions inmany cases, but theymight not eliminate distortions
completely. As we have seen, with v2 the political distortion
suffered by a is lower but it is still positive.
3.3.1. Games with many players
One would expect that the gap between an economic solution
and the closest political solution is decreasing in the number of
players. This is in fact what happens. In the limit, the set of political
solutions is the interval [0, 1], then it coincides with the set of
economic solutions.
Proposition 2. As n →∞,Ψi(Σ)→ Ψi(Γ ).
This means that, when the number of players is infinite, for any
economic game γ ∈ Γ it is possible to find aweighted voting game
v(γ ) ∈ Σ such that each player receives the same payoffs from
the two games. Put differently, with a larger number of players
there are more chances of finding a weight apportionment with
small political distortion. The reason is that as the number of
players increases the set of political solutions (the set of bullet
points) becomes less and less coarse. This leads to the conclusion
that political distortion induced by weighted voting is a relevant
problem in situations with a fairly small number of players. Vice
versa, if correctly chosen, weighted votes are effective when
applied to large committees or boards. Somehow paradoxically,
in reality we observe the opposite: a limited use of weights in
situations where the number of voters involved is quite large.
4. Outside options
So far we have assumed that partners have no outside options
in the political game. Minority groups cannot undertake smaller
projects by their own initiative nor they can disobey the will of the
majority and step out of the project. The decision about the project
can be taken only through a centralized political process. This
7 Let us see why the set of all SS solutions with three players consists of these
six points. Recall that p(S) in (2) is s!(n−s−1)!n! . Observe that, with three players,
p(S) can only have two values: 13 and
1
6 . Political payoffs can only be given by
weighted sums of these two values, where weights can only be integers from 0 to
2. It is easy to verify that there is no allocation of votes such that φi(·) = 56 . Thus
Ψi(Σ) =

0, 16 ,
1
3 ,
1
2 ,
2
3 , 1

.legitimizes the use of simple characteristic functions for describing
weighted voting: majority coalitions yield the full payoff and
minority coalitions get zero. No coalition, apart from a winning
one, can produce any payoff.
The underlying notion of political union is rather rigid. It corre-
sponds to a high level of centralization in which given decisional
areas are the exclusive competence of the political institution
(States, federal systems, boards in companies, . . . ). This is compat-
ible with the traditional concept of a sovereign state, in which the
state itself is indivisible and it does not give up any of its compo-
nents (e.g. territories, competencies, etc.). This usually applies also
to confederate and federal unions which do not allow for secession
rights, although there are a few examples in which such rights are
recognized, at least formally (e.g. Canada or the former Yugoslavia).
What would one expect with a lower level of centralization,
such that partners can subtract themselves from the majority’s
will? Is political distortion still there?We find that if centralization
decreases, also the political distortion decreases and it can even
disappear in a totally decentralized political scenario. The reason
is that partners have outside options. They can undertake projects
on their own and get a positive payoff.
Suppose that partners have the option of realizing the project
unilaterally (or together with sub-groups of agents). In this event,
however, they bear a ‘‘political cost’’. We interpret this cost as
consisting in a fine that theymust pay to themembers that remain
with the union. Let us assume that this payment is proportional to
the payoff of the unilateral project. For example, if doing the project
by myself yields 0.3, I have to pay (1− α) · 0.3 of political cost and
I get α · 0.3 as net payoff.8 We claim that if α lowers down to zero,
the political distortion decreases until it disappears. Let us see this
with our three-State example.
Example 2. Take the economic game (N, γ 1) and assume that the
States have the option to leave the union and pay a ‘‘fine’’ which
is a share (1 − α) of their payoffs. Call (N, v2) the ‘‘new’’ political
game. The characteristic function is the following.
– v2(∅) = 0.
– Single players get economic payoffs minus the fine: v2(a) =
αγ 1(a) = α · 0.3; v2(b) = α · 0.1; v2(c) = α · 0.2.
– Two-State coalitions get the economic payoff plus the fine paid
by the player who has left the union: v2(a, b) = γ 1(ab)+ (1−
α)γ 1(c) = 0.5 + (1 − α) · 0.2; v2(a, c) = 0.6 + (1 − α) ·
0.1; v2(b, c) = 0.4+ (1− α) · 0.3.
– Finally, v2(a, b, c) = 1.
The Shapley solution for this political game is:
φa(v
2) = 0.33+ α · 0.1
φb(v
2) = 0.33− α · 0.1
φc(v
2) = 0.33.
Interestingly, as soon as the fine for leaving the union approaches
zero (i.e. α → 1), the political payoffs converge to the economic
payoffs: the political distortion disappears (i.e. φ(v2)→ ϕ(γ 1)).
The intuition is clear. If leaving the union is cheap, the partners
in the minority are simply better off not participating. Outside
options cannot be ignored in the political bargaining. As a result,
the political game subsumes the underlying economic bargaining
game.
8 In a sense, α parameterizes the level of centralization of the political group. If
α = 0, there is no centralization: players bear no cost if they leave the group; their
outside option is fully available. If α = 1, there is perfect centralization: players
cannot abandon the political union and get a positive payoff.
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distortion is positively related to the cost of leaving the political union.
This model predicts that political distortions due to majority
voting are an issuewhenever breaking (by leaving the group or not
adhering to themajoritywill) is a costly option. Interestingly,when
the cost is zero, players’ threats of doing things by their own affect
the political bargaining in the same way as they would affect the
economic bargaining.
If any player has an incentive to pay the fine and do the project
by himself, the others leave him at least with his net stand-alone
payoffs. The outcome is that nobody leaves the union, the project is
realized and no Pareto inefficiency occurs. Therefore, allowing for a
‘‘secession clause’’ into a constitutionmitigates the effects of voting
rights malapportionments and lowers the potential for internal
distributive conflicts. This possibly explains why the possibility
of leaving the European Union by any member country has been
explicitly introduced in the recently adopted Lisbon Treaty.
We have modeled the cost of not adhering to the majority’s
decision as a purely redistributive mechanism based on fines.
No inefficiency occurs. This is consistent, for example, with the
rules of the Stability Pact of the European Monetary Union.9 One
might alternatively think that sticking with the union is a ‘‘money
burning’’ mechanism, like in the case of a secession war. The union
generates collective losses which may imperil the project and
lead to the breakup of the union itself.10 Exploring this kind of
inefficiency is beyond the scope of this paper.We leave it for future
extensions.
5. The random selection of voters
So far we have followed a positive approach. We have shown
that, given an economic game, unless the number of players is in-
finitely large, it may be impossible to find a voting rule based on
qualified majority and weighted votes which reduces political dis-
tortions to zero. We have also shown that allowing for a seces-
sion clause mitigates the effect of political distortions. Hereafter
we take a normative perspective, in which we suggest a different
voting method that, for any economic game, eliminates political
distortion. With this method agents are randomly selected, with
given probabilities, to take part in a group that will make the po-
litical decision by a simple majority.
Political distortions have been defined above as the difference
between the expected value of playing the political game (i.e. the
Shapley–Shubik index) and the expected value of playing the
economic one (the Shapley value). The problem is that when the
political game is aweightedmajority voting the two payoffs do not
always coincide. Intuitively, this problem arises because weighted
voting is a discrete method for generating political power. Our
aim here is finding a continuous method; i.e. a voting method
whose expected payoff can be any real number. The idea is giving
‘‘chances’’ to participate in voting rather than ‘‘weights’’. Let us
illustrate this method by following up Example 1.
Example 3. We want a voting method, call it vr(γ 1), whose
Shapley–Shubik index is φ(vr(γ 1)) = {0.43, 0.23, 0.33}. Let us
describe vr as follows: ‘‘the way payoffs are shared will be de-
cided with probability 10% by a alone; with probability 20% by a
9 Any country which breaks the public deficit target has to refund the other
members with a fine that is proportional to its GDP.
10 For instance, one may think that politically weak but economically strong
partners feel entitled to higher payoffs. Their sense of aggrievement leads them to
destroy the others’ payoffs through a war. This is a Pareto suboptimal mechanism
and the resulting political game does not satisfy superadditivity. The outcome is the
breakdown of the union.and c; with probability 70% by a, b, and c in simple majority vot-
ing’’. It is easy to see that for this voting game a’s expected payoff
is φa(vr(γ 1)) = 10% · 1 + 20% · 1/2 + 70% · 1/3 = 0.43. Simi-
larly, φb(vr(γ 1)) = 70% · 1/3 = 0.23, and φc(vr(γ 1)) = 0.33. No
political distortion occurs.
One possible description of the voters’ random selection is that
one ball is drawn from a box that contains 10% blue balls, 20%
green balls and 70% red balls. Blue means that only a will vote;
green means that a and c will vote; red means that all players
will vote. The idea in Example 3 is that rational risk-neutral agents
are indifferent between being selected for voting, with the risk of
getting low or high payoffs, and agreeing in advance on a division
that reflects their expected SS values. For example, player c is
indifferent between getting 0.33 in advance and accepting the
random selection with 10% chance of getting nothing, 20% chance
of getting 1/2 and 70% chance of getting 1/3. All players split the
available wealth in the same way as they would have split it into
the market.
A key role in this votingmethod is played by the chance of being
selected for the voting game. We will show that for any economic
game it is possible to find a ‘‘chance allocation’’ such that political
distortions are zero. Let us first describe how to compute these
chances for a generic economic game. Then we define the Random
Selection Voting Rule (RSVR). Finally we show that no political
distortions occur if the RSVR is adopted.
Consider the economic game (N, γ ), and its Shapley solution
ϕ(γ ). Re-label the players following the decreasing order of their
Shapley values: player 1 is the one with the largest Shapley value
(player a in the example); player 2 is the next one (c in the
example), and so on:
ϕ1(γ ) ≥ ϕ2(γ ) ≥ · · · ≥ ϕn(γ ). (4)
Players are listed in terms of their economic relevance in γ , as
measured by the Shapley value. Callυm, (m = 1, . . . , n) the simple
majority game that includes the firstm players in the Shapley value
ranking (from 1 to m). We have n simple majority voting games.
Player 1 has the chance to vote in games υ1, υ2, . . . , υn; he always
votes. Player 2 participates in one of games υ2, υ3, . . . , υn, but not
in υ1; . . .player n has only the chance to participate in υn together
with all the other players:
Simple majority games
Players υ1 υ2 · · · υn−1 υn
1 • • · · · • •
2 • ... • •
...
. . . · · · · · ·
n− 1 • •
n •
The ‘‘chance allocation’’ amounts to generating a probability
distribution over the set of the υm games (m = 1, . . . , n).
Definition 2. An RSVR for (N, γ ) is a probability distribution over
the set of υm such that
Pr

υm
 = m · [ϕm(γ )− ϕm+1(γ )] form = 1, . . . , n− 1
m · [ϕm(γ )] form = n. (5)
In words, an RSVR is a voting rule by which voters are randomly
selected to participate in a committee that decides by a simplema-
jority. A committee of m members includes the m most economi-
cally relevant players. The probability of forming that committee
is computed according to (5).
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Proposition 4. For any economic game (N, γ ), no political distor-
tions occur if the political game is based on the RSVR defined above.
What is relevant here is not weighted votes but probabilities to
participate in voting. Players with more economic power are as-
signed higher probability. If probabilities are computed correctly,
then players expect from the voting game exactlywhat theywould
expect from the political game. This voting method replicates the
outcome thatwould be produced by amarketmechanism inwhich
players’ bargaining power only derives from their relevance in the
economic game.11
Proposition 4may be interpreted in a large number perspective,
where the xj’s are frequencies rather than probabilities. Suppose
the economic game (N, γ ) is repeated many times. At any time
there will be a different subset of players selected to make the
political decision. Reasonably, the selected players will split the
payoff equally among themselves, leaving the others with zero.
After a large number of times, the total SS payoffs of any player
will approximate the total Shapley values of the economic games.
Notice that the RSVR proposed here is not the unique
mechanism which eliminates political distortions. What makes
it desirable and possibly easy to implement in real situations is
simplicity and fairness. As pointed out earlier, random selection is
not observed in reality. There are cases in which players accept to
rotate in voting (e.g. ECB). In other cases, differently sized groups
of players select one representative which may or may not have
weighted votes (e.g. IMF or the UN Security Council). Both rotation
speed and selection of representatives are discrete mechanisms
which (partially) eliminate distortions only if the game is repeated
a large number of times. With an RSVR expected distortions can be
made arbitrarily small even for economic games which are played
a limited number of times.
5.1. The constitutional perspective
So far we have implicitly assumed that the regulator which has
the power to enforce the voting rule also has a precise knowledge
of the economic game. In fact, in a typical ‘‘constitutional’’ perspec-
tive the regulator has the power to establish the rules or voting pro-
tocol but it has no concise knowledge of the worth attainable to
each coalition. Moreover, the voting protocol cannot be changed
any time partners play a different economic game. What can be
said in this case? Suppose that the regulator has to write a single
voting rule for a long-term partnership amongst different agents.
Examples are treaties of supranational institutions, constitutions
of federal unions, or even statutory provisions for merging com-
panies or joint ventures. The regulator ignores all future economic
games, but it may know the game that will be played ‘‘on average’’.
If the RSVR is computed on this average game, distortions will be
eliminated ‘‘on average’’.
Proposition 5. Let {(N, γ1), . . . , (N, γt)} be a set of t economic
games played by the agents in N. Call (N, γ¯ ) the average game of
this set, where, for any S ∈ 2N , γ¯ (S) = 1t
t
j=1 γj(S). The average
political distortion is zero if the payoffs of each game in the set are
split using the RSVR based on the average game.
11 Observe thatwith the RSVR individuals are given a lottery ‘‘over simplemajority
games’’. Requiring that for all i the solution of the RSVR equalsϕi(γ ) implies that any
player is neutral towhat Roth calls ‘‘ordinary risk’’ (Roth, 1988a, pp. 57–58). Laruelle
and Valenciano (2003) provide further insights on the ordinary risk neutrality
involved here. The reader may notice that the result in Proposition 4 derives from
the idea that any payoff vector can be obtained as a linear combination of games
whose solutions are equal divisions amongst participants.This proposition amounts to saying that in the long run total
political distortion is zero if the selection probabilities of the RSVR
are set by looking at the average game γ¯ (S).
Let us see more specifically how γ¯ (S) and the selection proba-
bilities should be computed in this constitutional perspective. The
Social Planner ignores the different roles that players will have in
future economic games. Let us assume it can identify, for any player
i, some measure of his economic relevance, Pi. If no information
is available about future economic projects it is natural to expect
that each player’s contribution is proportional to his economic rel-
evance. Examples of economic relevance are population, GDP, cap-
ital endowments, natural resources, stock shares in the company,
. . . , or appropriate convex combinations of these measures. Order
the players by their economic relevance (i.e. i < j ⇔ Pi > Pj, (i, j ∈
N)). Take Pi as i’s expected marginal contribution to any coalition
and define the average economic game as follows:
∆iγ¯ (S) ≡ Pi. (6)
Corollary 6 below characterizes the selection probabilities in the
RSVR.
Corollary 6. If the RSVR is such that
Pr

υm(P1, . . . , Pn)

=

m · (Pm − Pm+1) for m = 1, . . . , n− 1
m · Pm for m = n (7)
the expected political distortions are zero.
The idea is simple. In a constitutional perspective economic
relevance captures how a player will contribute on average. No
political distortion occurs on average if random selection is based
on economic relevance as specified by (7).
6. An application: the governing council of the ECB
With a view to large-scale enlargements of the euro area, a new
votingmechanism based on the rotation of governors was adopted
in 2002 for the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.12
The new mechanism will be implemented as soon as the number
of members in the euro area exceeds 18. At the present time this
number is 17 and all governors have the right to vote. In this section
wemeasure the political distortions generated by the new rotation
mechanism. We show that the distortions are quite high. Then we
compute the RSVRwhich would lower distortions to zero.13
Under the newmechanism, the number of governors exercising
a voting right does not exceed 15. Governors rotate in and out
of the voting right after one month. Countries are split in three
groups, based on the size of their economies. Rotation speed
varies across groups. Assuming that all the 27 EU members have
adopted the single currency, the first group is made by the five
biggest countries. Four governors out of five have vote rights.
Thus, the permanence rate in the first group is 4/5. The mid-sized
countries are 14, and their permanence rate is 8/14. The remaining
8 small countries have a 3/8 permanence rate. The six members of
the Executive Board have a permanent vote right. Thus the total
number of votes is 21.
We build the rotation voting game, vR, as follows. There are
15 voting governors with one vote each. A not totally unrealistic
12 The Governing Council is the main decision-making body of the European
Central Bank. It consists of the six members of the Executive Board, plus the
governors of the national central banks of the euro area countries.
13 Recently a power analysis of the new rotation system has been carried out by
Belke and Von Schnurbein (2012). They provide measurements for both traditional
SS indices and preference-based indices.
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Political distortions in the ECB governing council.
Rotation rule Random selection rule
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8
Country Perm. rate Polit. powera Econ. power Distortion Sel. chance ∆ Sel. chance Distortion
frequencies φi(vR) ϕi(γ¯ ) PDi(vR, γ¯ ) frequencies PDi(vRS , γ¯ )
Germany 4/5 5.33 20.40 −15.07 100 4.45 0
France 4/5 5.33 15.95 −10.62 95.55 3.86 0
UK 4/5 5.33 14.42 −9.09 92.49 8.37 0
Italy 4/5 5.33 11.63 −6.30 84.12 11.24 0
Spain 4/5 5.33 8.82 −3.49 72.88 21.50 0
Netherlands 8/14 3.81 4.52 −0.71 51.38 9.12 0
Poland 8/14 3.81 3.00 0.81 42.26 2.38 0
Sweden 8/14 3.81 2.66 1.15 39.88 0.80 0
Belgium 8/14 3.81 2.56 1.25 39.08 1.62 0
Austria 8/14 3.81 2.38 1.43 37.46 2.40 0
Greece 8/14 3.81 2.14 1.67 35.06 2.86 0
Denmark 8/14 3.81 1.88 1.93 32.20 5.04 0
Portugal 8/14 3.81 1.46 2.35 27.16 0.13 0
Finland 8/14 3.81 1.45 2.36 27.03 0.14 0
Ireland 8/14 3.81 1.44 2.37 26.89 4.65 0
Czech Rep. 8/14 3.81 1.13 2.68 22.24 0.16 0
Romania 8/14 3.81 1.12 2.69 22.08 3.40 0
Hungary 8/14 3.81 0.92 2.89 18.68 7.56 0
Slovakia 8/14 3.81 0.50 3.31 11.12 3.23 0
Bulgaria 3/8 2.50 0.33 2.17 7.89 0.40 0
Luxembourg 3/8 2.50 0.31 2.19 7.49 0.21 0
Slovenia 3/8 2.50 0.30 2.20 7.28 2.20 0
Lithuania 3/8 2.50 0.20 2.30 5.08 0.46 0
Cyprus 3/8 2.50 0.18 2.32 4.62 0.96 0
Latvia 3/8 2.50 0.14 2.36 3.66 0.75 0
Estonia 3/8 2.50 0.11 2.39 2.91 1.56 0
Malta 3/8 2.50 0.05 2.45 1.35 1.35 0
a Columns 3–8 are in percentages.hypothesis is that governors vote in the interest of their home
countries.14 We assume that the six permanent members of the
Executive Board always vote together. Therefore there is a 16th
voter who has got 6 votes. The majority threshold is 11 votes.
The SS indices in this 16 players game are 37.5% for the Executive
Board and 4.2% for each voting governor. Since governors do not
always vote, in order to compute their actual political power we
multiply this value by the permanence rates, then we normalize
the governors’ power to one in order to have a better idea of how
payoffs are split (see Table 1 column 3).15
Country ranking within the rotation system is based on a
composite indicator built on two parameters: the country’s GDP
(weighted 5/6), and the country’s share of the total IMF aggregated
balance sheet. We use this indicator also as a measure Pi of
economic relevance. Then we build the expected economic game,
γ¯ , using identities (6). With this framework, each country’s
Shapley value is given by its own measure of economic relevance,
as listed in column 4 of Table 1.
Consistent political distortions are expected to occur with the
rotation mechanism. Despite the six most economically relevant
countries may cast their votes more frequently, their political
power is systematically lower than their economic power. The
rotation mechanism is not able to prevent the occurrence of a
huge aggregate political distortion: total transfers from the first six
14 By contrast, if this was not the case, there would be no need of any rotation
system.
15 For example, the power of any of the four largest countries is computed as
follows:
4.2% · 4
5
· 1
1− 0.375 .
The idea behind normalization is that, differently from countries, the Executive
Board does not enjoy any economic benefits from participating in voting.members to the remaining 21 amount to 45.28% of total aggregate
payoffs.
As we know a Random Selection Rule may solve this problem.
Given the measures of economic relevance (col. 4), formula (7)
allows for computing the countries’ admission chances, in a
random selection game that we call vRS . These chances are listed
in columns 6 and 7. They should be read as follows: ‘‘Germany
has 4.45% probability of being the sole country voting; it has 3.86%
chance of voting together with France only; it has 8.37% chance
of being together with France and UK only, . . . . France has 3.86%
chance of voting with Germany only; 8.37% of being together with
Germany and UK only. . . .’’ An alternative way to read this system,
that refers to col. 6, is: ‘‘Germany should vote 100% of times; France
should vote 95.55% of times; UK should vote 92.49% of times. . . .’’
Ideally, the group of governors that vote in the Governing
Council may actually be selected by drawing a ball from a box
which contains a large number of balls. 4.45% of these balls are
marked ‘‘Germany’’, meaning that if that kind of ball is drawn,
only Germany will have voting right. 3.86% of the balls are marked
‘‘Germany and France’’. 8.37% of balls are marked ‘‘Germany,
France and UK’’ . . . .
With this voting method no political distortion occurs: political
payoffs equal economic payoffs.
7. Conclusions
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. First, on the positive
side, we show that in a large mass of cases voting weights are not
sufficient to balance economic with political power.
Second, on the normative side, we propose an alternative
method based on random selection of voting rights. Partners are
selected for voting according to a precise probability distribution,
with the chance of voting in a small group and getting a lot, but
also the risk of not voting at all and getting zero. Of course, more
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selected. The probability distribution may be set up such that
political power equals economic power. We argue that a rational
risk-neutral agent would be indifferent between playing this kind
of voting game and accepting a sure payment which amounts to
the monetary equivalent of his economic power.
This paper suggests that the ancestral ‘‘democratic’’ principle
of granting all members a permanent right to vote may lead in
the long run to an enormous amount of undesired wealth redistri-
bution among partners. Methods with rotating members, like the
ones adopted by the ECB or the UN Security Council, may reduce
but not completely counteract political distortions.
This paper also suggests that the political distortion is crucially
determinedby thenature of the political pact. Distortions are lower
when partners have the chance to break the pact (e.g. seceding,
leaving a federation, withdrawing from a joint venture, . . . ). Even-
tually, this can be done at a cost.We find thatwhen this cost is zero,
no political distortion occurs and the political bargaining subsumes
perfectly the underlying economic bargaining. In other words, in-
cluding a secession clause or a breakdown scenario among the
constitutional or statutory provisions reduces distortions substan-
tially.
Finally some caveats. First, risk neutrality may not be the most
appropriate way to look at preferences over political issues, and in
many cases side-payments may not be feasible. Unfortunately re-
moving quasi-linear preferences would imply a critical departure
from this approach. Second, the use of partition functions instead
of characteristic functions might improve the analysis of coalition
formation in economic games with outside options. Third, in this
paper we have considered only a quite simplified voting scheme:
direct voting in committees or unicameral representative democ-
racies, inwhich the representatives of the samedistrict always vote
together. Realistically voting schemes may be more complex, al-
lowing for bicameralism, procedural provisions, checks and bal-
ances, vetoes. . . . Some of these aspects can be managed without
abandoning the coalitional game approach of this paper. For ex-
ample, appropriate coalition structures or compound games may
be used. This might suggest interesting extensions of our work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Consider a game (N, γ ) ∈ Γ . With-
out loss of generality, let γ (N) = 1. Let us call Di(γ ) = {∆i
γ (S) : S ⊆ N \ i} the vector of i’s marginal contributions to
all the other players’ coalitions, with ∆iγ (S) defined as in (1).
Given the convexity of game γ (see Section 3 and footnote 4),
Di(γ ) is a vector in the 2n−1-dimensional unit-cube. Let P be
the 2n−1-dimensional vector of the coalition probabilities as-
signed by the Shapley solution in (1): P = {p(S) : S ⊆ N \ i},
and Di = {Di(γ ) : (N, γ ) ∈ Γ } be the set of all vectors of i’s
marginal contributions in games of Γ . It is easy to see that
Di is the unit-cube in ℜn−1 and is a convex set, i.e. given any
two points Di(γ0),Di(γ1), with (N, γ0), (N, γ1) ∈ Γ , it is al-
ways possible to find a game (N, γ2) ∈ Γ such that Di(γ2) =
(1 − t)Di(γ0) + tDi(γ1) ∈ Di for any t ∈ [0, 1]. By definition,
ϕi(γ ) = Di(γ ) · P , which means that player i’s Shapley value is
a linear transformation of Di(γ ). If Ψi = {ϕi(γ ) : (N, γ ) ∈ Γ }
denotes the space of all player i’s percentage Shapley values,
then we can write Ψi = Di · P , that is Ψi is a linear continu-
ous transformation of Di in ℜ. Since Di is convex, then also Ψi
is convex. Namely, Ψi = [0, 1], which is a closed subset of the
real numbers, and therefore is dense inℜ.
(ii) Now, let us call Di(Σ) = {Di(v) : (N, v) ∈ Σ} the set of i’s
marginal contributions in all the simple games. The elements
of any Di(v) ∈ Di(Σ) are only either 0 or 1, therefore Di(Σ) is
a non-convex subset of ℜn−1. Correspondingly, Ψi(Σ) ={φi(v) : (N, v) ∈ Σ} is the space of all player i’s SS values, with
φi(v) defined by (2), therefore Ψi(Σ) = Di(Σ) · P . Of course,
Ψi(Σ) is a continuous transformation of Di(Σ), but Di(Σ) is
not convex, so Ψi(Σ) is a non-dense subset of Ψi = [0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Take p(S) in the Definition 2 of political
value. Recall that p(S) = s!(n−s−1)!n! . CallΠ(n) the set of all possible
values of p(S). Notice that Π(n) is coarse if n is small, but, as n
increases, it becomes more and more populated. In the limit,Π(n)
coincides with the unit interval. Observe that in this case political
solutions can be viewed as weighted sums of all elements inΠ(n)
in which the weights can only be integers from zero to 2n (see
Definition 2 and footnote 7). If n → ∞, then Π(n) → [0, 1] and
any point in [0, 1] can be a solution of a political game; i.e. it can
be such a weighted sum of the points inΠ(n) = [0, 1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let v be a political (weighted voting)
game, and let vα be the same voting game in which partners have
the option of leaving the union if they pay a ‘‘fine’’ which is a share
(1 − α) of their option’s payoffs (see Example 2). Let us re-write
the political distortion in Definition 1 as:
PDi(v, γ ) =

S⊆N\i
p(S) · {[v(S ∪ i)− γ (S ∪ i)] + [γ (S)− v(S)]}
PDi(vα, γ ) =

S⊆N\i
p(S) · {[vα(S ∪ i)− γ (S ∪ i)]
+ [γ (S)− vα(S)]}.
Wemay have three cases. Let us see how PDi(vα, γ ) changes with
respect to PDi(v, γ ).
– First, observe that any player has an incentive to leave the union
if S is a minority. In this case, v(S ∪ i) = 0 and v(S) = 0.
Leaving the union and joining the minority S yields vα(S ∪ i) =
αγ (S ∪ i) and v(S) = αγ (S). Both squared brackets in the LHS
of PDi(vα, γ ) can only decrease in absolute value and approach
zero with α → 1.
– Second, if i is the pivot in S, then v(S ∪ i) = 1 and v(S) = 0. In
game vα , the payoffs are: vα(S ∪ i) = γ (S ∪ i)− (1− α)γ (N \
S ∪ i) and vα(S) = 0. The first squared brackets in the LHS
of PDi(vα, γ ) can only decrease in absolute value and approach
zero with α → 1.
– Third, if S is a majority, v(S ∪ i) = 1 and v(S) = 1. In game vα ,
payoffs are: vα(S ∪ i) = γ (S ∪ i) − (1 − α)γ (N \ S ∪ i) and
vα(S) = γ (S ∪ i)− (1− α)γ (N \ S ∪ i). Both squared brackets
in the LHS of PDi(vα, γ ) can only decrease in absolute value and
approach zero with α → 1.
Thus,
∂PDi(vα, γ )
∂α
< 0
lim
α→1 PDi(v
α, γ ) = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. By (2), no expected political distortion
occurs if the xm(γ )’s solve the following system of linear equations
(m = 1, . . . , n):
1 · x1(γ )+ 12x2(γ )+ · · · +
1
n
xn(γ ) = ϕ1(γ )
1
2
x2(γ )+ · · · + 1nxn(γ ) = ϕ2(γ )
. . . · · · ... ...
1
n
xn(γ ) = ϕn(γ )
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system admits a unique solution,
x1(γ )
x2(γ )
...
xn−1(γ )
xn(γ )
 =

1 · (ϕ1(γ )− ϕ2(γ ))
2 · (ϕ2(γ )− ϕ3(γ ))
...
(n− 1) · (ϕn−1(γ )− ϕn(γ ))
n · ϕn(γ )

as for the generic xm(γ ) this solution is Eq. (5). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Let pR(γ¯ ) be the random selection voting
rule for (N, γ¯ ). Specifically, pR(γ¯ ) is a probability distribution over
the set of vm such that pR(vm(γ¯ )) = Pr (υm(γ¯ )) as defined in (5).
For any player i, the average political distortion is:
PDi(pR, γj) = 1t
t
j=1

φi(pR(γ¯ ))− ϕi(γj)

.
Observe that for any i,
1
t
t
j=1
ϕi(γj) = ϕi(γ¯ )
and
PDi(pR, γ¯ ) = 0.
Therefore,
PDi(pR, γj) = 1t
t
j=1
φi(pR(γ¯ ))− ϕi(γ¯ ) = 0. 
Proof of Corollary 6. Observe that if ∆iγ¯ (S) ≡ Pi, for any S ⊂ N ,
and any i, then ϕi(γ¯ ) = Pi, for any i. Applying Propositions 4 and 5
completes the proof. 
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